* Minsera.Blogspot.com * AL Australia gagal mengirimkan kapal selam untuk membayangi satuan AL
Rusia. Karena 3 sedang dalam kondisi tidak operasional sesuai jadwal
dan 3 lainnya yang aktif berposisi terlalu jauh. Menunjukkan bahwa RAN idealnya mempunyai 12 kapal selam dengan 6 yang aktif disetiap waktu.
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A recent incident involving a Russian
naval task force that sailed close to Australia’s northern waters
highlights issues of force structure, readiness, and basing for the
RAN’s submarines. In the end, Australia had to content itself with
sending 2 ANZAC Class frigates and an AP-3C Orion aircraft, because
there were no submarines that could reach the area in time.
The RAN actually has 3 submarines available, but HMAS Rankin was sailing from Western Australia to Tasmania in the south, and the other 2 active submarines were conducting work-up trials off the coast of Perth in the west. To give readers a geographic idea, sailing from Australia’s western coat to its northeast coast is kind of like sailing from Spain to Estonia. None of Australia’s 3 operational submarines could arrive in time.
This isn’t a failing of the Collins Class. A force of 6 submarines is only going to generate about 3 operational boats, and Australia’s submarine base remains fixed on its inaccessible west coast. Defensively, that’s great. In deployment terms, not so great. Lacking the endurance and constant high-speed capabilities of nuclear-powered boats, Australia needs submarine bases in its north and/or east if it wants to project power forward in a timely way. The 2012 Force Posture Review has recommended this course of action. Sources: The Australian, “Russian ships expose failings of Australian submarine operations”.
The RAN actually has 3 submarines available, but HMAS Rankin was sailing from Western Australia to Tasmania in the south, and the other 2 active submarines were conducting work-up trials off the coast of Perth in the west. To give readers a geographic idea, sailing from Australia’s western coat to its northeast coast is kind of like sailing from Spain to Estonia. None of Australia’s 3 operational submarines could arrive in time.
This isn’t a failing of the Collins Class. A force of 6 submarines is only going to generate about 3 operational boats, and Australia’s submarine base remains fixed on its inaccessible west coast. Defensively, that’s great. In deployment terms, not so great. Lacking the endurance and constant high-speed capabilities of nuclear-powered boats, Australia needs submarine bases in its north and/or east if it wants to project power forward in a timely way. The 2012 Force Posture Review has recommended this course of action. Sources: The Australian, “Russian ships expose failings of Australian submarine operations”.
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